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The problem of clearly understanding the market 
structure of banking in North Carolina is addressed in 
"The Panking Industry in North Carolina, 1955-19?5i A 
Discussion of Its Changing Structure."  For clarity, the 
problem is divided into three partsi  describing the 
regulatory structure and how its several parts have effected 
the banking market) establishing that North Carolina's 
banking market is strongly oligopolistic} and examining 
this structural change and the problems associated with 
the effects of concentration of market power. 
The procedure involved various methods of investi- 
gation.  Reviewing the regulatory structure established the 
patterns these agencies exhibited during the past two 
decades that facilitated market concentration. Data collected 
from these agencies illustrated the facts of market concen- 
tration and the trends of structural change.  Finally, a 
review of the literature of the effects of concentration 
presents the different problems created by market power. 
The result of this thesis is a view of how North 
Carolina's banking market became oligopolistic.  Also, the 
necessity for a change in the attitude of the regulatory 
agencies becomes apparent.  V/hat accompanies these 
realizations   is an awareness  that these agencies must turn 
policies from the promotion of bankin£ growth to  the service 
of consumer welfare  in order to correct   the trend  of market 
dominance established   in North Carolina. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The past two decades have witnessed a large amount 
of bank expansion in North Carolina.  Fassage of several 
federal and state regulations facilitated the predominant 
methods of bank expansion.  The industry structure that 
emerged in North Carolina during these decades of ex- 
pansion exhibits oligopolistic properties. The effect of 
this oligopolistic market can most easily be understood by 
examining the inherent trade-offs between the promotion 
of competition and of productive efficiency in the banking 
market. 
Bank expansion, whether accomplished by merger, 
branching, or affiliation, creates new competitors in 
markets that may have previously been controlled by one 
or a few banks.  On the other hand, expansion can promote 
a few dominant banks with the market power to unduly 
influence the decision making process of borrowers and other 
lenders. The threat of increased entry stimulates market 
participants to improve their performance and the quality 
of services they offer.  These two conflicting effects of 
bank expansion require delicate balancing to protect 
consumer welfare and to provide optimal structuring of the 
banking industry. 
The effect of concentration, market power, theoreti- 
cally distorts market performance. Establishing this empir- 
ically requires analysis procedures beyond the scope of 
this thesis and the state of the art to date. However, 
clear conclusions can be drawn from the trends of the mar- 
ket structure and their effect on competition, efficiency 
and consumer welfare gains. 
The purpose of this paper is twofoldi  first to review 
the regulatory statutes and present trends in the industry 
structure of banking in North Carolina. Second, to discuss 
the effects of concentration with respect to competition, 
efficiency and consumer welfare.  The method of investiga- 
tion examines first the agencies and legislation pertinent 
to the issue at hand.  Second, measures of structural change 
are examined and, finally, theories of the effects of con- 
centration are presented as they pertain to the North Caro- 
lina market.  The conclusion to the study will suggest 
policy implications for the future. 
Comparisons of the North Carolina market structure 
with the rest of the nation as well as fifth district banks 
will be most useful for evaluation in this study.  The Fifth 
Federal Reserve District includes Washington, D.C., Virginia, 
West Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina and South Carolina. 
CHAPTER II 
REGULATORY STRUCTURE 
The United States has a confusing system of bank reg- 
ulation growing out of the Constitutional protection of 
intrastate commerce from federal regulation on the one hand 
and on the other, the need for a central banking authority. 
Each of the fifty states has absolute control over all the 
state banks that elect not to be members of the Federal 
Reserve System or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 
These nonmember and noninsured state banks make up only 
1.54  of all banks.  The other 98.5^ of all banks are subject 
to the overlapping jurisdiction of three federal agencies 
as well as the state agency.1  The Comptroller of the 
Currency has jurisdiction over all national banks.  The 
Federal Reserve System controls all national banks and any 
electing state banks. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo- 
ration has a say in the affairs of all members of the 
Federal Reserve and any state banks choosing to be insured. 
Table 1 shows a breakdown of these four bank groups. 
1Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 1969 Annual 
Report (1970), p. Jf. 
TABLE 1 
NUMBER AND DEFOSITS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS BY CATEGORY 
DECEMBER 31, 1969 
Insured Banks 
Members of Federal 
Reserve System 
National 
State 
Total Fed 
Members 
Insured State Non- 
Members 
Total  Insured 
Banks 
Uninsured Banks 
Total  All 
Banks 
Number 
4,669 
1.201 
5,870 
7.60? 
13,^73 
208 
% Deposits 
3*.1# $257,843,791,000 
8.8^ 94.444.591.000 
42.9 352,288,382,000 
55.6 84.701.283.000 
98.5 436,989,665,000 
1.5 2.999.693.000 
58.655 
21.43 
80.0 
19_a 
99.3 
0.7 
13,681  100.01 $439,989,358,000  100.0-1 
Source« Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
1969 Annual Report 
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 
The percentage of total deposits in each of these groups 
is not proportionate to their percentage of total banks. 
Federal Reserve System members account for a portion of total 
deposits twice that of their percentage of total banks. 
While they represent only 42.9?? of total banks, they account 
for 80.O1 of total deposits. 
The history of the Federal Reserve System originates 
with its creation by the Federal Reserve Act of 1914 which 
LSee Table 1. 
established the structure in existence today. Twelve 
regional reserve banks were created to be governed by a 
seven man central board.  While their terms originally 
were set for ten years, to free them from executive branch 
domination, these terms were extended to fourteen years in 
1933. 
The Federal Reserve's jurisdiction extends to all 
national banks which are required to buy stock in the per- 
tinent regional reserve bank.  State banks can elect to 
become members thus gaining access to the services offered 
by the Reserve. 
At the same time these banks become subject to the 
supervisory powers of the Fed.  As a central bank, the Fed 
sets reserve regulations, controls bank credit, and buys 
and sells government securities in the open market.  The 
Fed also regulates extensions of credit for the purchase of 
intangibles, branching by state member banks, payment of 
interest on deposits, interlocking directorates, foreign 
banking, bank mergers and bank holding companies. 
In an attempt to hold down the concentration of power 
over the wealth of the nation, all federally regulated banks 
are prohibited in the Federal Reserve Act from underwriting 
securities or purchasing stock in corporations.1 Member 
David Leinsdorf and Donald Stra, Citibank, with a 
Foreword by Ralph Nader (New York* Grossman Fublishers, 
1973), p. 272. 
banks cannot have directors, officers or employees who 
serve as directors, officers or employees of security 
caompnies nor can they purchase their own stock or make 
loans when their own stock is offered as collateral. 
All these powers give the Federal Reserve several 
integral functions in the United States economy.  The 
monetary policy of the country is implemented by the Federal 
Reserve's powers of altering reserve requirements, of 
changing the discount rate and of engaging in open market 
operations.  The banking system itself runs more smoothly 
for the check clearing,, collection service and coin and 
currency .shipments provided by the district offices of the 
Federal Reserve. T.oth  the purchase and redemption of 
government bonds as well as the actual handling of tax 
payments are handled through the Federal Reserve.  Finally, 
the 7ed is responsible for the examination of state member 
banks though this is generally done in cooperation with the 
state banking authority. 
THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY 
The comptroller of the Currency controls the largest 
portion of deposits.1 While this agency was created in I863 
to finance the federal army during the Civil War,2 the 
office now has many more powers than the initial power to 
charter banks authorized to issue notes secured by govern- 
ment bonds.  This power is not to be underestimated, as the 
Comptroller has the ability to alter the structure of the na- 
tional banking system through its power to approve charters, 
branching and mergers.  The criteria for acceptance of a 
new charter is that the bank have the financial backing as 
well as the managerial ability to run a bank.3 There must 
be proof of a need in the proposed area for a new bank. 
Request for new branches are subject to state laws and will 
be dealt with later. Mergers and acquisitions however must 
also be approved by the Comptroller's office.  These powers 
enable the Comptroller to control both the number and size 
of banks in an area. 
1 See Table 1. 
Leinsdorf, p. 284. 
3Ibid. 
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The Comptroller also establishes rules and regulations 
in regard to a bank's investment practices,  loan limits to 
individual customers, deposit gathering,   payment of dividends, 
reporting of information,   permissible activities and   trust 
departments.     These powers are enforced by periodic   (3 in 
every  2 years)  audits.     Assets,   liabilities, management, 
adherence to the law and banking practices are scrutinized 
and reported  to the officers  of each bank. 
The Comptroller  is  a presidentially  appointed   5 year 
position,   similar to any member of the cabinet. 
THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT  INSURANCE  CORPORATION 
The insurance of bank deposits,   both demand and  time, 
through the FDIC  is  obligatory for all national and state 
member banks.     The  insurance  is also available to non-member 
banks.     Like any  other type of insurance,   Federal Deposit 
Insurance  is financed by assessments on the  insured depositors. 
Cf the  13,681 banks  in the nation in 19^9 only 208 were 
uninsured. 
LSee Table  1. 
The FDIC has power of examination over the non-member 
state banks that subscribe to their insurance but the most 
powerful function of the FDIC is the approval of mergers 
and branching.  This power gives the FDIC the ability to 
shape the market structure of banking. In 1974 the FDIC 
was relatively lenient with approvals for mergers and branch- 
ing. During the same period, it was strict with approvals 
of new charters.  Thus the FDIC contributed to the concen- 
tration of the banking market. The leniency of approvals 
for mergers and branching from i960 to 1974 is exhibited in 
Figures 1 and 2. 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 1974 Annual 
Report (1975),PP. 12-16. 
FIGURE  1 
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Chan C APPLICATIONS FOR DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND 
BRANCHES APPROVED BY THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT 
INSURANCE  CORPORATION. 1960-1974 
F?^j Oapojit «n* 
■■ Ofpoiii in* lanca-opa-rating no* -• 
8 
-7 
-6 
-5 
1960        1961        196?        1963       1964        1965        1966        1967        191 
*■   : iiidw If. il-i'-i and c •'-' limilid Htiica elliCM 
"9)0     1971      1977      1973 
Sources     Federal Deposit  Insurance  Corporation 
FIGURE 2 
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Chart D MERGERS APPROVED BY 
FEDERAL BANK SUPERVISORY AGENCIES, 1960-1974 
Numb*' ef Apc'Ovell 
I        1 Approved by Comptroller of the Currency 
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'Pined liefrmi"! Hey 13. 1960. to end 0< VW 
96'      1961      >969      1910      1971      19/?      197) 
Source:      Federal Deposit  Insurance  Corporation 
TABLE 2 
FEDERAL AND STATS REGULATIONS AFFECTING THE BANKING STRUCTURE 
FIFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
AUGUST, 1970 
National Banks 
FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
State 
Member Banks 
1. Entry Require- 
ments 
a. Minimum 
Capital(require- 
ments for each 
population 
range) 
b. Faid-in 
Surplus 
2. Domestic 
Branches 
0-6,0001 
$50,000 
6,000-50,000: 
$100,000 
50,000 +. 
$200,000 
Fermitted. 
Prior approval 
by Comptroller 
required 
Fermitted. 
Frior approval 
by Board of 
Governors 
required 
Insured 
Nonrnember Banks 
Fermitted. 
Frior approval 
by FDIC 
required 
Feaeral law does not geographically restrict 
branching. Each bank, including each 
national bank, is subject to the geographic 
restrictions on branching imposed by the 
state in which it operates. 
State 
Regulations 
North 
Carolina 
0-3,0001 
$100,000 
3,000-10,000: 
$150,000 
10,000-25,000: 
$200,000 
25,000-50,000: 
$250,000 
50,000 +: 
$300,000 
501 of capital 
stock 
r>o 
TABLE 2 (cont.) 
FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
3. Mergers 
^. Bank Holding 
National Banks 
Fermitted. 
Prior approval 
by Comptroller 
required if 
resulting bank 
is a national 
bank 
State 
Member Banks 
Fermitted. 
Frior approval 
by Board of 
Governors 
required if 
resulting bank 
is a state 
member bank 
Insured 
Nonmember Banks 
Permitted. 
Prior approval 
by PDIC 
required if 
resulting bank 
is an insured 
nonmember bank 
State 
Regulations 
North 
Carolina 
Fermitted. 
Frior approval 
by Commis- 
sioner of 
Eanks required 
if resulting 
bank is a state 
bank 
Mergers involving any insured bank are 
subject to the Bank Merger Act of i960 
which1 
1) prohibits mergers resulting in 
a monopoly, and 
2) prohibits mergers which lessen 
competition unless the anti- 
competitive effects are clearly 
outweighed by increased public 
convenience. 
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 defines 
bank holding company as any company con- 
trolling 253 or more of the voting stock 
of 2 or more banks or which controls the 
election of a majority of the directors 
of 2 or more banks.  Within the limits 
of this definition, prior approval by 
the Board of Governors is required fon 
No statutory 
provisions 
regulating 
bank holding 
company for- 
mations , 
acquisitions 
or mergers 
• 
TABLE 2 (cont.) 
1) the formation of a bank holding 
company, 
2) the acquisition by a bank holding 
company of 5# or more of the 
voting stock of any bank, and 
3) the merger of a bank holding 
company with another bank holding 
company. 
The Board receives recommendations of the 
Comptroller and state banking authorities 
regarding bank holding company acquisitions 
which affect national and state banks, 
respectively.  The Board must not approve« 
1) acquisitions resulting in a monopoly, or 
2) acquisitions which lessen competition, 
unless the anticompetitive effects are 
clearly outweighed by increased public 
convenience. 
Subject to certain detailed provisions, bank 
holding companies may not engage in business 
unrelated to banking. 
Sourcei Relevant Federal and state statutes. 
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THE C0"Ti:iSoI0N5R OF BANKS OF NORTH CAROLINA 
The main function of the Commissioner of Banks in 
North Carolina the state regulatory agency, concerns branch- 
ing and entry requirements.  The Commissioner has some 
powers of investigation and regulation but these apply to 
only 1.5$ of all banks.  These banks are both nonmembers 
of the Federal Reserve System and noninsured by the FDIC. 
As far as banking structure is concerned, the state regula- 
tions of greatest impact are those requirements established 
for entry, merger and branching, applicable to all banks 
within the state. 
Sntry requirements in banking structure affect the 
number of banks in a given state.  Strict requirements limit 
the ease with which a new bank can enter the market and thus 
restrict the number of banks within a state. Also these 
requirements in the form of capital minima affect size 
distribution as bank size, measured by total assets or total 
deposits is related to capital — bank size varying directly 
with the ratio of total assets/capital. 
"oth Federal and state statutes establish minima for 
the amount of capital necessary to open a bank.  The amount 
of these minima give some indication of the relative stringency 
lJ.   Alfred Droaddus, "Regulations Affecting Banking 
Structure in the Fifth District," Monthly Review Federal 
Reserve Bank of Richmond (December 1970), p. 7. 
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of regulations concerning entry in a given state.  As can be 
seen in Table 2, North Carolina requirements, in most every 
population category, are double those of federal require- 
ments and this is also true with respect to other states in 
the fifth district.  This stringency contributes to the fact 
that North Carolina has the smallest number of banking 
organizations in the fifth district with the exception of 
South Carolina.  Having similar banking practices, North 
Carolina and South Carolina differ in the number of banking 
operations by only one. 
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TABLE 3 
NUMBER OF BANKING OFFICES IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT 
GROUPED BY STATE 
State and type of 
bank or office 
Total 
Maryland-all offices 862 
Banks 117 
Unit Banks 37 
Banks operating branches 80 
Branches 7*5 
North Carolina-all offices 1,639 
Banks 92 
Unit Eanks 21 
Banks operating branches 71 
Branches 1.5*7 
South Carolina-all offices 672 
Banks 91 
Unit Banks 28 
Banks operating branches 63 
Branches 581 
Virginia-all offices 1,400 
Banks 288 
Unit Eanks 9^ 
Banks operating branches 19* 
Branches 1,112 
Washington-all offices 848 
Banks 101 
Unit Banks *1 
Banks operating branches 60 
Branches 747 
West Virginia-all offices 240 
Banks 214 
Unit Banks 188 
Banks operating branches 26 
Branches 26 
Sourcei  Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Annual Report 1974 
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Another contributing factor to the relatively small 
number of banking organizations in North Carolina is the 
branching policy of the Commissioner of Banks in North 
Carolina. 
BRANCHING 
There are basically two ways to create branches for an 
established banki  one is through merger with another esta- 
blished bank, usually the main purpose of merger, and the 
other is by 'de novo' branching, the creation of an entirely 
new banking facility.  Merger or 'de novo' branching directly 
affect the banking structure since these activities change 
both the asset size and the number of banks in a given area. 
However, the effects of each are opposite in economic impact. 
Branching by merger eliminates an existing banking 
entity reducing the competitiveness of the market. De novo 
branching on the other hand, creates a new banking entity 
but not organization. This tends to increase competition 
by bringing more banking organizations into a given area. 
However, both kinds of branching increase market power of 
the expanding bank by increasing its asset size. 
Federal law does not restrict branching geographically. 
Therefore each bank, whether state or national, is subject 
to the ultimate constraint of the state laws concerning 
branching.  North Carolina allows statewide branching with 
19 
prior approval of the Commissioner of Banks.  It is reasonable 
to assume that this office has been liberal with branching 
approvals since, while North Carolina has the second fewest 
number of banking organizations in the fifth district, it 
has the largest number of banking offices.1 
In addition to the four regulatory agencies, North 
Carolina banks are subject to both federal and state laws. 
Cf notable importance to the topic at hand are the Bank 
jrger Act of i960, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 
amended in 1970 and the Act of October 28, 197^. 
Ti": :AM: VERGER ACT OF i960 
The Bank "lerger Act of i960 exempted banks from the 
provisions of the Clayton Act and established a set of 
standards for assessing the competitive impact of bank 
mergers.  These standards are different from those which 
traditionally apply in other business sectors. They allow 
mergers which result in monopoly power or a lessening of 
competition if increased public convenience outweighs the 
1Thomas Y. Coleman and Bradley H. Gunter, "Recent 
Developments in Fifth District Banking,"  Monthly Review 
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond (December 1972), 
pp. 11-12. 
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anticompetitive effects.  In North Carolina between 1955 
and 1970 there were 131 mergers resulting in a decrease 
in the number of banking organizations from 220 to 98 (9 
new banks were started in this period).1 The Merger Act 
of i960 promoted bank mergers in North Carolina. 
BANK HOLDING COMPANY ACT 1956 amended 1070 
One of the most significant federal laws is the Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1956 because five of the top six 
leading banks in North Carolina are one bank holding company. 
The law as formed in 1956 covers holding companies that 
control two or more banks. Multibank holding companies are 
required by this law to seek approval of the Federal Reserve 
for all acquisitions.  The law also requires of these acqui- 
sitions that "...all the activities of which are or are to be 
of a financial, fudiciary, or insurance nature... so closely 
related to the business of banking or controlling banks as to 
be a proper incident there to..."2 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Summary of 
Accounts and Deposits in All Commercial Banks (June 30, 1970), 
P. 202. 
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C., sec. 
1843(c) (8). 
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When the Bank Holding Company Act was written in 1956 
one bank holding companies were mostly small family owned 
banks controlling less than 5^ of the nation's commercial 
bank deposits.  However, in 1968 there was a move by a 
number of the nation's largest banks to form one bank holding 
companies in order to avoid regulation by the Federal Reserve 
imposed on multibank holding companies by the 1956 law. 
Tn fact by the end of 1968, 23^ of the nation's commercial 
bank deposits fell under the control of one bank holding 
2 companies.  The advantages for a one bank holding company 
created by their omission in the 1956 law include vast 
directorate powers, tax avoidances and both horizontal and 
vertical acquisitions as well as unrelated acquisitions. 
ADVANTAGES FOR CNE BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 
FRE-1970 AKENDKSNT  
Because the organization of a one bank holding company 
places the bank as a subsidiary of a larger company, that 
larger company can expand into nonrelated banking activities 
without breaking the law or coming under the supervision of 
the Federal Reserve.  These activities prohibited to banks 
and multibank holding companies but perfectly legal for one 
1Leinsdorf, p. 205. 
Hearings before the House Committee on Currency and 
Banking on the Bank Holding Company Amendments,   91st Cong., 
Hh sess.   (1969). 
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bank holding companies include insurance, travel services, 
leasing, data processing, mutual funds, and other areas.1 
The traditional separation of banking and commerce disappears 
and the concentration of financial powers becomes inevitable. 
In a one bank holding company shareholders no longer 
have direct voting rights concerning the bank's management 
because the bank becomes a part of the larger holding company. 
The shareholder's votes weaken in this new organization and 
the management of the bank gains great autonomy and inde- 
pendence from the shareholders. 
The one bank holding company, pre-1970 amendment, also 
gained independence from the laws that govern other banks 
regarding the range of activities and the geographical areas 
in which they can be involved. Especially in the areas of 
leasing and travel, the bank after reorganization can cross 
state and national boundaries, a move which is illegal for 
banks not organized into one bank holding companies. 
By using accounting manipulations, transactions can be 
moved around within the holding company to avoid taxes and 
regulation by the Federal Reserve.  For instance, if travelers 
checks operations are transferred to a subsidiary of the 
holding company then they are no longer classified as demand 
Leinsdorf, p. 215. 
23 
deposits  subject to  reserve requirements.     This  frees   the 
money from  the  17.5^ reserve requirement and allows  it to 
be transferred  to a general investment or lending fund. 
Clearly,   this is an advantage open to one bank holding 
companies but not open to other type banking organizations. 
THE  1970 AMENDMENT 
Late in 19^9 Wright Fatman,  Chairman of the House 
Banking and Currency Committee,   introduced a bill to eliminate 
the unfair advantages available to one bank holding companies. 
Heated  debate  continued  for close  to  twelve  months.     However 
the final outcome resulted in the followingi     the Federal 
Reserve has powers of regulation over the acquisitions of 
one bank holding companies and   is required  to see  that all 
these acquisitions are functionally related   to banking and 
can reasonably be  expected  to produce benefits for the public 
that outweigh possible adverse effects.    These benefits are 
greater convenience,   increased competition,   gains in efficiency. 
The adverse effects are undue concentration of resources, 
decreased or unfair competition,   conflicts of interest,   or 
unsound banking practices. 
In  1971   the  Fed  published   the  regulations  it  had 
adopted  to enforce  the  1970 amendment.     They  basically out- 
lined the areas approved within the law's restriction that 
Ibid,  p.   217. 
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bank holding companies, multibank or one bank, could acquire 
only businesses related to financial, control or management 
matters of the banking industry. 
Among the approved areas of activity falls the granting 
or acquiring of loans, extensions of credit or mortgages. 
The Fed defined as acceptable acquisitions, finance, credit 
and factoring companies. Also acceptable is the operation of 
industrial banks, Morris plan banks, or industrial loan 
companies but these banks are prohibited from taking demand 
deposits or making commercial loans. 
Among the nonbanking activities considered to be within 
the domain of a one bank holding company arei  trust services, 
real estate management, community development investments, 
insurance agent or underwriter, courier service and consultant 
services for other banks. 
It will be seen later how these regulations of the 
1970 amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 
affect the judicial branch's interpretation of a definition 
for markets in the cases of bank concentration. 
There are two sides to the issue. On the one hand 
bankers feel that banks compete in the market with all other 
1Federal Banking Law Reports, Text of Regulation Y as 
Adopted by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System (1971). 
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industries  that offer similar services even though none 
can  offer all the services   that a bank can.     On the other 
hand prosecutors  reason that because  of a bank's exclusive 
right to demand deposit services  their market must be 
defined as including only banks   in their geographical area. 
BRANCHING   AND   THE   1970   AMKNT)T>:RNT 
However the most important extension of the 1970 
Amendment and  its  interpretation concerns branching, 
particularly because branching is  allowed statewide in North 
Carolina.    Applications for branches either de novo or from 
acquisitions are approved only if the performance of the 
activity proposed by the holding company can reasonably be 
expected to produce benefits   to the public such as greater 
convenience,   increased competition or gains  in efficiency 
that outweigh possible adverse effects such as undue 
concentration of resources, decreased or unfair competition, 
conflicts of interest or unsound banking procedures. 
This  last restriction has been a great concern of 
Arthur Burns and  the Federal Reserve Eoard.       Their main 
interest has been the stability of the holding company and 
their bank capital adequacy.     Burns and his board fear the 
holding companies use acquisitions to trade on that same 
banking strength.     This sort of policy could lead  to increased 
Laurence C.  Leafer,   "Current Trends of the Federal 
Reserve  Board,"  Group  Statutes  Reports   (Charlottei   First 
Union National Bank,   197*0,   t>.   10. 
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concentration in the banking industry  if Burns and his board 
use bank capital adequacy as the only criterion for expan- 
sion.     The stronger banks would  tend to expand gaining more 
strength thus being more  likely  to expand again.    This sort 
of spiral would  tend to favor the larger banks without 
regard to  the  effects  of concentration. 
While The Federal Reserve  issued cease and desist orders, 
enjoining any  activities if not closely related to banking, 
the holding companies were protected  from retroactive en- 
forcement of this  law by a  'Grandfather Clause'   which allowed 
the holding companies to continue in any activities  they  had 
entered   into before June 30,   1968.    The choosing of this date 
reflects   the stiffness of the negotiations and the inflexi- 
bility of both sides.    However in spite of the Grandfather 
Clause the  1970 Amendment rids most of the  one bank holding 
companies  of superfluous activities. 
THE  ACT  GF  OCTOBER  2 8.   197*+ 
The Act of October 28,   197^ extends supervisory 
authority  of the Federal Reserve Board to bank holding 
companies and their nonbanking subsidiaries.     It also grants 
cease and desist authority to the Fed in order to remedy a 
supervisory deficiency  left over from the 1956 law.     The 
guidelines  of this  supervisory authority keep the activities 
of the bank within a holding company in the public  interest, 
specifically  stating that their powers are not to be used  to 
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interfere unduly with the activities of the holding company. 
This last clause protects the depositor and the reputation 
of the bank from any activities which might result in 
significant damage. 
The 197^ Act further defines a bank holding company as 
"any company which directly or indirectly owns, controls or 
holds, with power to vote 25 percent or more of the voting 
shares of any bank or company that is or becomes a bank 
holding company under the 1956 (amended 1970) Act or which 
controls the election of a majority of the directors of the 
bank or company."  As with most aspects of banking, prior 
approval of the Board of Governors is required for a bank or 
a holding company to become a bank holding company. A further 
restriction on bank holding companies prohibits them from 
loaning to or investing in companies of which they are a 
subsidiary but they may loan to those companies which are 
a subsidiary of the bank itself. 
Before discussing the effects of these laws consideration 
of some of the problems associated with concentration ratios 
in the banking industry will be undertaken. 
1Ibid, pp. 20-22. 
28 
CHAFTER III 
CONCENTRATION RATIO LIMITATIONS 
Among the limitations of concentration ratios are 
problems with the number of banks to include in the ratio, 
how to define the product market and how to define the 
geographic market.  The first of these problems concerns the 
number of banks to be included in the ratio - one or three 
or five.  The shift from one to another slightly alters the 
degree of concentration but can be judged by comparing the 
overall statistical correlations between the 1 bank/3 bank 
and the 1 bank/5 bank ratios.  In Table b,  Guttentag and 
Herman show that for the nation as a whole the ratios are 
fairly high. 
TABLE k 
COEFFICIENTS   OF CORRELATION BETWEEN  ONE-BANK, 
THRE3-BANK AND  FIVE-BANK CONCENTRATION  RATIOS 
JUNE 30,   1964 
One  v.   Five 
One  v.   Three 
Three  v.   Five 
Source:     FDIC  data 
65 Large Metropolitan Areas 50 States 
.?6 .93 
.88 .96 
.91 -98 
1Jack M.   Guttentag  and  Edward  S.   Herman,   "Banking 
Structure  and  Performance,"   The Bulletin New York  University 
(February  1967),   p.  23. 
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The correlation coefficients are significant for metropolitan 
areas and very high for states. Thus for the purposes herein 
there is little difference in the choice of concentration 
ratios.  Where appropriate differences will be presented but 
for the most part the statewide C-, will be the most logical 
and convenient ratio to present.  Table 5 lists in order the 
five largest banks in North Carolina and shows the 1,3, 5 
concentration ratios for total offices and total deposits. 
TABLE 5 
FIVE LARGEST BANKS IN NORTH CAROLINA 
DECEMBER 31, 1974 
Bank or Banking Organization 
Wachovia Bank and Trust Company, 
N.A., Winston-Salem 
North Carolina National Bank 
Charlotte 
First Union National Bank of 
North Carolina, Charlotte 
First-Citizens Bank and Trust 
Raleigh 
The Northwestern Bank 
North Wilkesboro 
^umber Fercent Total Fercent Concen- 
-.anking yanking Deposits Total tration 
Offices  Offices  ($000's) Deposits Ratio 
195 
159 
185 
217 
166 
11.9 2,489,386 20.8  Cj  20.8 
9.7 2,310,173 19.3 
U.3 1,428,264 11.9  c3  53TO 
13.3 1,060,958 8.9 
10.1    922,544   7.7 c      Z8j; 
Sources t FDIC 1974 Annual Report Sr  Woody's 
o 
-.-.-.. 
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A second limitation of concentration ratios results 
from the fact that the number of firms in the actual market 
is not included in the concentration ratio.  The number 
of alternatives in the market place and their behavior, 
whether price followers or competitive fringe, may be 
insufficiently weighted in a one, three or five bank ratio. 
The significance of this ratio depends on the correlation 
between concentration ratios and the number of firms in the 
market.  Table 6 shows that for the nation as a whole, one 
and three bank ratios are moderately correlated. Again by 
using the C„ this limitation will not effect this study. 
TABLE 6 
COEFFICIENTS  OF CORRELATION BETWEEN 
NUMBER  OF BANKS  AND CONCENTRATION 
RATIOS BY  POPULATION 
OF METROPOLITAN AREA 
N0VEM3ER   18,   196^ 
Number 
201 
20 
129 
29 
23 
Population of 
Metropolitan 
Areas 
All 
50,000-99,999 
100,000-^99,999 
500,000-1,000,000 
Above   1,000,000 
Number of Banks   vs. 
One-Bank Concen-     Three-Bank Concen- 
tration Ratio tration Ratio 
-A5 
-.78 
-.58 
-M 
-.55 
-.88 
-.78 
-.72 
-.61 
Sources     Calculated  from  FDIC  data 
1 Ibid,   p.   26. 
, 
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The arbitrariness  of market definitions  in banking 
constitutes a third  limitation of concentration ratios. 
'his arbitrariness extends to both product market definitions 
as well as geographic market definitions.     Product markets 
and geographic markets are intricately related because the 
geographic market depends  on the particular product under 
consideration.     This  issue is  further clouded by  the fact 
that banks are multiservice or multiproduct institutions. 
'    ::K5T DEFINITIONS 
In any study of concentration,   product markets and 
geographic markets must be defined   in some fashion.     In the 
study  of the banking industry  the task is particularly 
difficult and  confusing.     The phraseology   in the Clayton 
Act ambiguously refers  to  the "line of commerce" and   "the 
section  of  the  country"   to  define product  and  geographic 
markets.     In  Erown Shoe  Company   v.   United  States,   'line  of 
commerce'   is   interpreted  as  the product market and   'section 
of the country'   as   the geographic market.       And in 
Philadelphia National Bank  v.   United  States   this  interpretation 
was restated  in a more workable form than previous definitions. 
For either product or geographic markets  "the narrowest 
2 
reasonable market  is  the  relevant  one." 
Eugene M, Singer,   Antitrust Economics   (Englewood 
Cliffs,   New Jersey.   Prentice-Hall,   Inc.,   1968),   pp.   2M+-24?. 
2 
Ibid,   pp.   254-256. 
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A reasonable market with respect to the line of 
commerce of a commercial bank is an evasive concept. 
Commercial banks are multiproduct multiservice institutions. 
While they have a virtual monopoly on the demand deposit 
service,  they also offer savings,   loan,   insurance,  mortgage 
and trust services.     These services directly  compete with 
less diverse institutions!     savings and loans,  insurance 
companies,   trust companies,  mortgage and loan companies, 
and finance companies. 
The courts,   however,   have  consistently  ruled   that 
the relevant line of commerce is commercial banking and 
have disregarded these other institutions.     The argument 
supporting this interpretation is summarized in 
Philadelphia National Bank v.   United States   (19^3)«1 
that the cluster of products   (various kinds of 
credit)  and services   (such as checking accounts 
and trust administration)  denoted by  the term 
'commercial banking,'   composes a distinct line 
of commerce.     Some commercial banking products 
or services are so distinctive that they are 
entirely free of effective competition from 
products  or services of other financial insti- 
tutions?   the checking account is in this category. 
Others enjoy such cost advantages as to be 
insulated within a broad range from substitutes 
furnished  by  other  institutions... 
United States v.   Thiladephia National Bank,  37^ U.S. 
321,   356-357,   and  326,   (1963),   quoted   in David   Leinsdorf 
and Donald Btra,  Citibank  (New Yorki   Grossman Publishers, 
1973).    p.   338. 
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Finally,   there are banking facilities which,  although 
in terms  of cost and price  they are freely competitive 
Withthe_facilities provided by  other financial 
institutions,  nevertheless enjoy a settled customer 
preference,   insulating them to a marked degree 
from competitions   this seems to be the case with 
savings deposits.     In sum,   it is  clear that com- 
mercial banking is a market   'sufficiently inclusive 
to be meaningful in terms of trade realities.' 
This  interpretation is supported by several facts. 
Ilutual savings  and loan associations  offer one-half percent 
higher interest rate on time deposits however the growth 
rate of such deposits is only in line with commercial bank's 
time deposit growth rate.1    Another fact that supports 
this  interpretation that commercial banking is a market in 
and of itself concerns bank loyalties.     In an interview, 
Dr.  James Golson,   Vice President in charge of marketing for 
First Union National Bank,   explained that once a customer 
selects one service with a bank,  because of loyalties the 
chances that they will select that bank for another service 
increases with each successive service. 
Ibid,   p.   340. 
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PRODUCT  LINE 
In the Manufacturers Hanover case,   Judge Lloyd 
MacMahon differentiated the product line by the two 
categories  of wholesale and retail.1    The argument runs 
that a wholesale bank is one that caters  to large accounts 
such as  large business firms and governments.     These banks 
have relatively few accounts but large ones usually  over 
$100,000.     These accounts enjoy the prime interest rate and 
are not bound   to close geographic proximity. 
The retail bank caters to the small business and 
household  accounts,   looking for a large number of small 
accounts.     These customers come  from a local geographic 
market.     There are banks that fall into a third category 
enjoying both retail and wholesale customers.    These banks 
compete in both local and national   (or regional)  markets. 
This differentiation has been found basically pedantic 
2 
by Guttentag    and Herman.    Their study reveals that these 
markets  have  similar concentration  ratios. 
Furthermore it is  reasonable to concentrate on state 
markets because of the inertia and loyalty  that confine bank 
customers to state and  local banks and because North Carolina 
Guttentag,  p.  71. 
2„ Guttentag,   p.   80. 
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has statewide branching thus forcing most banks to compete 
throughout the state.    Guttentag and Herman found that with 
statewide branching,  concentration ratios were biased 
downward but with small differences from unit branching 
states. 
GEOGRAPHIC   T-iARKET 
There are few geographic restraints with respect to 
the product of the banking industry.    Money  is the classi- 
fungible commodity with minor transportation cost.     Thus 
actual distance has  little to do with circumscribing geo- 
graphic markets.    Additionally the clearing services  of the 
Federal Reserve help reduce any problems of distance to a 
great extent. 
The court ruled in the Philadelphia National Bank case 
that an intrastate SMSA approximates the narrowest reasonable 
2 
market.       However,   this definition depends on the amount of 
branching in a particular state.     The extension of markets 
to statewide markets is   justifiable  in North Carolina because 
of the relatively loose restrictions on statewide branching. 
Guttentag and Herman's findings mentioned above support this 
extension. 
1Guttentag, pp.   51-53. 
2 
United States v.  Philadelphia National Bank, 
PP.   357-358. 
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I;ULTIPRCDUCT MULTISERVICE INSTITUTIONS 
The services offered by banks numbers as high as 
seventy distinguishable products or services.  The main ser- 
vices are:  checking account facilities, financial accounting 
and payment services, lock box facilities, time and savings 
accounts, advisory or trust department services, customer 
credit, agricultural credit, business credit, real estate 
credit, loans for the purchase of securities, foreign 
exchange or letters of credit, underwriting of municipal 
securities, safekeeping facilities, coin and currency supply, 
and miscellaneous financial instruments - certified checks, 
travelers checks, cashiers checks, letters of credit. 
Most banks do not offer all of these services!  it is 
a function of their location and size. A large metropolitan 
bank would have little demand for agricultural loans while 
a rural bank similarly would have little, if any, demand for 
foreign exchange facilities.  In this regard, the best 
generalization that can be made is that the banking market 
is local for small business and household services.  "Some 
small customers may, of course, have potential alternatives 
beyond local market areas, but for the majority the forces 
of ignorance, inertia, local ties, the relative disinterest 
of outside banks in nonlocal customers, and the cost and 
other disadvantages of locating and maintaining outside 
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relationships, render nonlocal banking facilities poor 
alternatives."  In the Philadelphia National Bank case, 
a member of the Pennsylvania Banking Board testified that 
when making application for branches, banks invariably 
define their prospective market in terms of about a mile 
and a half radius, reflecting the strategic importance of 
convenience to the small depositor. 
For the larger customer, distance is less of a 
barrier.  Size and credit ratings become determining factors 
with fewer barriers created by local ties, inertia, igno- 
rance and the cost of doing business at a greater distance. 
In Luttrell and Fettigrew's study of banking facilities 
in the St. Louis area, 25* of firms with net worth over 
$1 million and 42"? of firms with net worth below $1 million 
banked principally with the bank closest to their main 
office.  This average distance was estimated at approximately 
2 
5.7 and 2.9 miles respectively. 
From all this it can be concluded that the market 
area definition depends on the type of service under con- 
sideration.  Definitions by political or administrative 
1Guttentag, p. ")6. 
2Clifton B. Luttrel and William E. Fettigrew, "Banking 
Markets for Business Firms in the St. Louis Area," Monthly 
Review Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (September 1966), 
P. 20. 
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boundaries  are   thus  by necessity  arbitrary.     However,   since 
North Carolina has   lenient statewide branching  laws,  a 
statewide concentration ratio is  less hampered by the 
restrictions mentioned above. 
Differences arise between state and SMSA concentration 
ratios in North Carolina,   the latter usually running 20 to 
30 percentage points   higher than the state percentages. 
Both types of ratios  will be presented   in this  thesis where 
possible because SMSA data are less often available  than are 
statewide data.    However for the  several reasons mentioned 
above,   this  will not   hamper the  progress  of  the  discussion 
at hand. 
ko 
CHAFTER IV 
TRENDS IN NORTH CAROLINA BANKING MARKET 
"RANCHES AND KERGSR5 
The sum of the effects of North Carolina state 
regulations on banking (stiff entry requirements, lenient 
branching regulations and liberal merger policy) can be 
seen in the following Tables 7 and 8. During the period 
of time between the passage of the Bank Holding Company 
Act of 1956 and the 1970 Amendment to that act, there was 
a net loss of 122 banking operations. None of this number 
fell into bankruptcy.  Absorption and mergers were the 
cause of this decrease in the number of banking organizations 
During this same period of time, the number of branches in 
operation increased by 793. 
After the 1970 Amendment to the 1956 Holding Company 
Act which put a stop to the 1968 one bank holding company 
movement, the rate of attrition of North Carolina banking 
operations slowed down drastically. Eetween 1970 and 197^ 
the net reduction in the number of banking organizations 
was only 6. However, the number of branches was increasing 
at an even faster rate. In just four years there were 428 
new branches. 
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By  way of comparison with the other twenty  states that 
permit statewide branching,  North Carolina lost the largest 
number of banking organizations between 1955 and 19?4.     None 
of the 12 8 banks fell into bankruptcy but ceased operations 
because of merger or absorption.    During this same period of 
time North Carolina gained the second  largest number of 
branches being second only to California which is bigger 
both  in size and population. 
Clearly,   this reflects   the relative leniency  of North 
Carolina authorities  in the opening of branches and the 
allowance of mergers. 
NEW ENTRY 
As mentioned in Chapter I,  North Carolina has stiff 
entry  requirements which  contribute   to  the  relatively  small 
number of banks   in the market.     Table  9 shows  the number of 
new banking  organizations created between  1955 and   197^. 
The number is small compared to both the number of new 
branches and  the number of mergers and absorptions. 
TABLE  7 
NUMBER OF BANKS  AND BRANCHES  IN STATES 
WITH  UNLIMITED BRANCHING 
ALASKA 
ARIZONA 
CALIFORNIA 
CONNECTICUT 
DELAWARE 
DISTRICT OF 
COLUMBIA 
HAWAII 
IDAHO 
MAINE 
MARYLAND 
NEVADA 
NORTH CAROLINA 
Dec. 31. 19*^ 
BRANCHES 
Dec. 31. 1970 Dec. 31. 1974 BANKS BANKS BRANCHES BANKS BRANCHES 
18 14 11 62 12 82 
11 95 12 323 25 425 
149 1212 152 3033 198 3490 
98 103 6l 436 139 774 
30 38 18 87 20 152 
1? 54 14 103 16 126 
10 55 10 140 12 151 
36 67 24 156 24 191 
59 95 k3 226 81 324 
152 168 115 521 117 745 
6 29 8 86 8 105 
220 326 98 1119 92 1547 
CO 
TABLE 7 (cont.) 
Dec. 
BANKS 
31.   Mi 
BRANCHES 
Dec. 
BANKS 
31.   1970 
BRANCHES 
Dec. 
BANKS 
31.   1974 
BRANCHES 
OREGON 49 1*5 49 337 50 424 
RHODE ISLAND 10 69 13 171 22 275 
SOUTH   CAROLINA 149 86 102 418 91 581 
SOUTH  DAKOTA 171 5* 161 98 158 115 
UTAH 51 45 48 139 55 186 
VERMONT 62 15 43 85 40 138 
VIRGINIA 316 176 233 825 288 1112 
WASHINGTON 103 208 91 558 101 747 
Source«  FDIC National Summary 1971 and 1976 
TABLE 8 
NET CHANGES IN BANKS AND BRANCHES 
1955 to 1974 
ALASKA 
ARIZONA 
CALIFORNIA 
CONNECTICUT 
DELAWARE 
DISTRICT OF 
COLUMBIA 
HAWAII 
IDAHO 
MAINE 
MARYLAND 
NEVADA 
NORTH CAROLINA 
OREGON 
1?55 
■n A TTVC 
-1970 1970- ■1974 1 Q*^ — 1 QHh bANKS BRANCHES BANKS BRANCHES  
l7JJ 
EANK3 BRANCHES 
-7 +48 +1 +20 -6 +68 
+1 +228 +13 + 102 +14 +330 
+3 +1821 +46 +457 +49 +2278 
-37 +333 +78 +338 +41 +671 
-12 +49 +2 +65 -10 +114 
-3 +49 +2 +23 -1 +72 
0 +85 +2 +11 +2 +96 
-12 +89 0 +35 -12 +124 
-\f +131 +38 +98 +22 +153 
-37 +353 +2 +224 -35 +577 
+2 +57 0 +19 +2 +76 
-122 +793 -6 +428 -128 +921 
0 +192 +1 +87 +1 +279 
■p- 
TABLE 8 (cont.) 
19^5- -1970 1970- •1974 195^ -1974 
BANKS BRANCHES BANK3 BRANCHES BANKS BRANCHES 
RHODE ISLAND +3 +102 +9 +104 +12 +206 
SOUTH CAROLINA -47 +332 -11 +I63 -58 +495 
SOUTH DAKOTA -10 +44 -3 +17 -13 +61 
UTAH -3 +94 +7 +47 +4 +141 
VERMONT -19 +70 -3 +53 -22 +123 
VIRGINIA -83 +649 +55 +2 87 -2 8 +936 
WASHINGTON -12 +350 +10 +I89 -2 +539 
Source:  FDIC National Summaries 1971 and 1975 
TABLE 9 
 MARY OF ACCOUNTS AND DEPOSITS 
IN ALL COMMERCIAL BANKS 
" -.TIC: \1  SDMI ARY 
JUNE 30, 1970 
STATES ~E~ '.- 
OPERATIONS 
NO. CF 
E INKS 
DEC. 31, 
1955 
NEW 
I ANKS 
With statewide branching prevalent 
CTHEH3 
BANKS 
CEASED 
OPERATIONS 
MERGERS 
AND OTHER 
ABSORP- 
TIONS OTHER CHANGE 
NO. CF 
BANKS 
DEC. 31, 
1970 
ALASKA 18 
ARIZONA 11 
CALIPORNI '.. 149 
CONNECTICUT 9R 
DELAWARE 30 
DISTRICT CF 
COLUMBIA 17 
HAWAII 10 
TDA"C 36 
MAINE 59 
MARYLAND 152 
NEVADA 6 
NORTH CAROLINA 220 
C REG ON 1*9 
RHODE ISLAND 10 
SOUTH CAROLIN\ 149 
2 
14 
139 
17 
1 
4 
2 
7 
6 
24 
3 
9 
24 
5 
19 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
9 
12 
135 
5^ 
13 
7 
2 
19 
21 
61 
1 
131 
2h 
2 
64 
0 
1 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
+ 
+ 
7 
1 
3 
37 
12 
3 
NC 
- 12 
- If 
- 37 
+   2 
- 122 
NC 
+  3 
- ^7 
11 
12 
152 
61 
18 
14 
10 
24 
43 
115 
8 
98 
k9 
13 
102 ■P- 
_   "L~  9   (cont.) 
1ANKS 
STATES 
SOUTH DAKOTA 
UTAH 
VIRGINIA 
WASHINGTON 
•    ■ CEASED 
OPERATIONS OPERATIONS 
NO.   OF MERGERS NO.   OF 
BANKS AND  OTHER BANKS 
DEC.   31, N SW ABSORP- NET DEC.   31, 
1955 BANKS CT-   . TIONS OTHER CHANGE 1970 
171 9 0 18 1 -     10 161 
51 20 0 23 0 3 kS 
52 0 0 19 0 -     19 kj 
316 58 0 140 1 -     83 ?33 
103 50 0 62 0 -     12 91 
"*■ 
CABLE  9   (cont.) 
tANC    : 
ITES 
OPERATIO]   ! 
NO. 
E IA1 
!C.   31, 
i°55 !   OTHE I 
With statewide 'branching prevalent 
ALASKA 
ARIZON , 
CALIFORNIA 
20NNBCTICUT 
DELAWARE 
DISTRICT  OF 
COLUMBIA 
HA .'All 
IDAHO 
I UNE 
WLAND 
NEVADA 
r'ORTH CAROLINA 
OREGON 
RHODE ISLAND 
SOUTH CAROLINA 
SOUTH DAKOTA 
TTAH 
VERMONT 
VIRGINIA 
.•'. I] INGTON 
14 
95 
1,212 
103 
38 
54 
n 
168 
29 
326 
145 
69 
86 
5* 
45 
15 
i"' 
208 
i'7 
247 
i,sor 
291 
44 
h5 
"3 
7< 
119 
30? ..- 
710 
171 
106 
282 
29 
16 
59 
515 
288 
10 
14 
155 
56 
13 
9 
8 
15 
25 
73 
2 
133 
25 
4 
71 
19 
25 
16 
155 
70 
CF3RATICN3 
NO.   OF 
BRANCJ ES 
TV ET DEC.   31, . re] ES OT    . CHANGE 1970 
£ 3 + 48 62 
9 24 + 228 323 130 10 +1 ,821 3,033 14 0 + 333 436 
8 0 + 49 87 
5 c + 49 103 
5 1 + 85 140 
2 0 + 09 !"' 
11 2 + 131 ??■' 
23 
2 
4 + 353 521 
1 + 57 86 
^5 
8 
5 + 793 1.119 0 + 192 337 
0 + 102 171 
19 2 + 332 418 
3 1 + 44 98 
5 
4 
2 + 94 139 
1 + 70 85 18 3 + 649 825 
2 6 + 350 55t ■e- co 
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Stiff entry requirements also effect the size dis- 
tribution of banks in the market. Table 10 shows that 
North Carolina tends toward large banks with a concentration 
of deposits in those having deposits of a billion or more. 
CONCENTRATION OF DEF0SIT5 
Graph 1 illustrates the total commercial bank deposits 
held by the three largest banking organizations in North 
Carolina for the years 1959, 1971 and 197^.  Listed in order 
of size, the banking organizations represented in Graph 1 
are North Carolina National Bank, Wachovia Bank and Trust, 
and First Union National Bank. Each belongs to a one bank 
holding company. Their market shares have tended to equalize 
with respect to each other over time. 
The market shares of these three banks however has 
increased with respect to the rest of the banking market 
as seen in Table 11. In 1970, the three bank concentration 
ratio for North Carolina was 51.02, an increase of 17.88 
percent in fifteen years. By 197^ the concentration ratio 
increased to 53•0. 
Using Co as a means of comparison, in 1970 North 
Carolina's banking market was the thirteenth most concen- 
trated market in the nation. This national ranking was 
achieved by the most rapid rate of increase in the nation of 
the total deposits accounted for by the three largest banks. 
' 
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!A £01 ■•CIFTRATIOr TRENDS 
It is interesting to note that for SMSA's the con- 
centration of deposits is higher than for the state as a 
whole. As seen in Table 12, the three largest banks account 
for higher percentages of total deposits in SMSA's than in 
states.  The change in Co and number of banks in the market 
can be attributed to the change in definition of the area 
included. The 1970 figures are for Commercial banks while 
the 197^ figures include Mutual savings banks. Also the 
/, areas are redefined in the 197^ figures to include 
larger geographic areas. For instance, the 197^ data is 
not available for Raleigh or Durham because these 1970 SMSA's 
were redefined as one SMSA in 197^. 
over the pertinent information of these statistics 
remains. SFSA concentration ratios run about 10 points 
higher than state concentration ratios. This is consistent 
with the theory that large banks attract and/or seek large 
accounts.  The larger business accounts will most likely be 
found in the larger metropolitan areas. 
TABLE 10 
NUKBER AND DEFC3ITS OF ALL COMMERCIAL BANKS 
IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT 
(DECEMBER 31, 1974) 
BANKS GROUPED BY 
DEFOSIT SIZE 
State 
WASHINGTON,   D.C, 
Banks  
Deposits  
MARYLAND 
Banks  
Deposits  
NORTH  CAROLINA 
Banks  
Deposits  
SOUTH  CAROLINA 
Banks  
Deposits  
VIRGINIA 
Banks  
Deposits  
WEST   VIRGINIA 
Banks  
Deposits  
All 
Banks 
16 
3.585.60U 
114 
8,011,894 
92 
11,952,870 
89 
3,867,270 
Less 
than 
$1  Million 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
288 6 
13,083,867 4,014 
$1 Million 
to 
$2  Million 
0 
0 
214 
4,979,614 
2 
1,522 
3 
4,549 
1 
1,702 
2 
3,731 
8 
11,953 
3 
5,045 
$2 Million 
to 
$5 Million 
1 
3.154 
10 
38,437 
11 
42,732 
14 
46,115 
39 
131,867 
19 
69,036 VJ\ 
TABLE 10 (cont. 
State 
$5 Million 
to 
$10 Million 
WASHINGTON,   D.C. 
0 
0 
MARYLAND 
167,389 
NORTH CAROLINA 
17 
126,123 
SOUTH CAROLINA 
27 
199,337 
VIRGINIA 
45 
340,345 
WEST VIRGINIA 
51 
395,953 
$10 Million  $2 5 Million   $50 Million 
to to to 
*25 Million  $50 Million  $100 Million 
2 
24,615 
36 
614,567 
26 
23 
335,074 
98 
1,681,642 
84 
1.381,887 
5 
178,282 
19 
611,183 
13 
447,257 
15 
503,003 
49 
1,732,521 
33 
1,138,026 
2 
152,148 
13 
803,306 
9 
589,518 
56,310 
19 
1,406,321 
17 
1.210,954 
TABLE   10   (cont. 
State 
$100 Million 
to 
$500 Million 
$500 Million 
to 
$1 Eillion 
$1 Eillion 
or 
more 
WASHINGTON,   D.C. 
4 
1,151,821 
1 
843,173 
1 
1,232,411 
MARYLAND 
it 
943,736 
4 
3,271,250 
1 
1,557,477 
NORTH CAROLINA 
10 
2,119,698 
1 
922,544 
4 
7,288,781 
SOUTH  CAROLINA 
6 
1,919,187 
1 
804,513 
0 
0 
VIRGINIA 
20 
3.985.*22 
2 
1,342,956 
2 
2,446,826 
WEST   VIRGINIA 
5 
777,191 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
5^ 
FIGURE 3 
SHARE OF TOTAL COMMERCIAL BANK DEPOSITS HELD 
3Y THREE LARGEST BANKS AND BANKING 
ORGANIZATIONS, NORTH CAROLINA 
DECEMBER 31, 1959, DECEMBER 31, 1971 AND DECEMBER 31, 197^ 
1959 1971 1974 
Source:  Board of Governors Federal Reserve^System) 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
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iBLE  11 
RELATIVE SIZE OF THE LARGEST   301      IRCIAL 
1 WRING   ORGANIZATION,   BY  STATS 
DECEMBER 31,   1955-JUNS 30,   1970 
I »E    ER  31,   1955 
PERCENTAGE OF ALL CCI'l^SRCT.VL 
BANK ESFCSITS INi 
STATES LARGEST 
BANK  OR 
BANK GRCUF 
With  statewide branching  prevalen 
ALASKA 25.8? 
ARIZONA 1*7.38 
CALIFORNIA 1+4.18 
CONNECTICUT 17.37 
DEI •   'AR ' 43.55 
DISTRICT CF COLUi E I . 29.61 
HAWAII 48.68 
IDAHO 35.07 
MAINE 11.73 
MARYLAND 13.64 
'•^VADA 76.84 
NORTH CAROLINA 16.64 
OREGON 44.97 
RHODE ISLAND 53.73 
SOUTH CAROLINA 21.92 
SOUTH DAKOTA 23.74 
OTA] 26.47 
VERMONT 
VIRGINIA 7.57 
WASHINGTON 32.74 
LARGEST LARGEST 
I :."KS  OR ANKS  OR 
BANK GROUPS BANK  GROUPS 
58.24 71.81 
90.38 95.61 
61.88 75.48 
39.63 48.65 
73.41 34.35 
64.39 73.96 
92.97 98.71 
75.58 83.71 
25.67 36.82 
36.33 49.02 
94.34 100.00 
33.14 42.15 
89.10 91.09 
90.89 96.02 
38.21 45.74 
37.19 41.01 
56.97 70.60 
20.77 29.66 
20.60 27.99 
58.82 72.07 
TABLE  11   (cont.) 
JUNE  30,   1970 
:   RCENTAGE OF ALL COMMERCIAL 
BANK DEFCSITS  INi 
STATES LARGEST LARGEST LARGEST 
.v.: OR BANKS  OR BANKS  OR 
"ROUT BANK GROUTS BANK GROUPS 
With  statewide branching, prevalent 
ALASKA 33.2? 69.26 85.25 
ARIZONA 45.95 90.58 96.93 
CALIFORNIA 38.30 60.90 77.53 
DELAWARE 32.30 ?4.23 91.45 
DISTRICT  OF  COLUM IA 30.40 69.72 90.16 
HAWAII 37.09 76.49 88.93 
IDAHO 36.67 77.47 86.29 
MAINE 13.16 35.28 51.78 
MARYLAND 19.20 42.56 60.31 
NEVADA 61.72 86.83 97.57 
NORTH CAROLINA 20.58 51.02 66.34 
OREGON 42.31 £3.58 86.29 
RHODE ISLAND 50.47 85.82 92.65 
SOUTH CAROLINA 22.89 46.63 59.23 
SOUTH DAKOTA 23.47 42.41 46.55 
UTAH 30.24 59.13 71.51 
VERMONT 14.30 37.46 49.4? 
VIRGINIA 13.73 34.23 48.06 
WASHINGTON 32.38 60.04 73.07 
Ok 
TABLE  11   (cont.) 
NET  CHANGS  1955-1970 
STATES LARGEST 
] ANK OR 
BANK GROUT 
With statewide branch ing prevalen 
ALASKA + 7.^0 
ARIZONA - 1.43 
CALIFORNIA - 5.38 
CONNECTICUT + 1.10 
DELAWARE - 10.75 
DISTRICT OF  COLUM IA + 0.79 
HAWAII - 11.59 
IDAHO + 1.60 
MAINE + l.*3 
ARYLAND + 5.56 
"     'ADA - 15.12 
NORTH  CAROLINA + 3.9^ 
OREGON - 2.66 
RHODE  ISLAND _ 3.26 
SOUTH CAROLINA + 0.97 
'.C"TH  BAHCT/, - 0.27 
•-.'.:■•: + 3.77 
V RMONT + 6 /Ik 
VIRGINIA - 6.16 
WASHI1 GTOl - O.36 
LARGEST LARGEST 
BANKS  OR BANKS  OR 
BATIK GROUPS BANK GROUPS 
+  11.02 + 13.44 
+    0.20 + 1.32 
-     0.90 + 2.05 
+    6.20 + 11.15 
+     0.82 + 7.10 
+    5.33 + 16.20 
-  16.45 - 9.78 
-     1.89 + 2.58 
+    9.61 + 14.96 
+    6.23 + 11.29 
-     7.51 - 2.43 
+  17.83 + 2^.69 
-     5.52 - ^.80 
-     5.07 - 3-37 
+    8.42 + 13.49 
+     5.22 + 5.5^ 
+     2.16 + 0.91 
+   16.69 + 19.81 
+   13.63 + 20.07 
+     1.22 + 1.00 
SNSA 
Asheville 
Charlotte 
Durham 
Fayetteville 
Greensboro-'Vinston- 
Salem-High  Foint 
Raleigh 
Wilmington 
'.Vhole State 
TAiLE 12 
PERCENT OF TOTAL DSFOSITS ACCOUNTED FOR 
BY THREE LARGEST BANKS 
GROUFSD BY SKSA 
Number 
of Banks 
6 
15 
6 
6 
19?0 
16 
10 
6 
98 
Fercent Total 
Deposits  Co 
81;.0 
82.1 
88.1 
74.5 
m. 2 
75.3 
75.8 
51.0 
Number 
of Banks 
6 
21 
KA 
9 
26 
NA 
6 
92 
1974 
Fercent Total 
Deposits C-i 
77.2 
76.8 
NA 
61.0 
76A 
NA 
73.2 
53.0 
Sources  Summary of Accounts and Deposits in All Commercial Banks, National 
Summary Table 4, June 30, 1970 FDIC 
N^KI°I 
DeP°si^svJ
n A11 Commercial and Mutual Savings Banks, 
•ational Summary Table 3, June 29, 1974 FDIC 
£n£Val«A?port of the pederal Deposit Insurance Corporation 1974 
Table 105.  /umber and Deposits of All Commercial Banks, 
December 31, 1974 FDIC 
$ 
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CHAFTSR V 
EFFECTS OF CONCENTRATION 
'.vine, established that North Carolina has a strongly 
concentrated banking market, the consequences of this con- 
centration should be explored.  The questions concerning 
competition and how it is affected by concentration are 
addressed in the next chapter. The following chapter deals 
with the question of relative performance. 
CC"r"TITIC-- 
Banking, a highly regulated industry, falls into a 
peculiar category of neither public or private good.  If 
r.othing else, the Twenties taught us that there must be a 
central banking authority, an issue that has been hotly 
debated since the time of Jefferson and Hamilton. The 
restrictions on entry clearly protect the public from 
bogus operations.  However, questions surrounding the 
severity or leniency of entry conditions are open to debate. 
North Carolina has strict entrance requirements that reduce 
the number of banks in the state.  Also reducing the number 
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of banks   in  the state are the laws permitting statewide 
branching.     The laws governing reserve requirements as well 
as   intervals  within which   interest rates  must remain 
further reduces competition as seen in the free market. 
however  concentration  is  not necessarily   followed  by  an 
inefficient or collusive market.     There can be vigorous 
rivalry among the few as  there can be collusive arrangements 
among  the many.     However,   there  is a lower probability of 
the  latter. 
There  are many   areas   in which banks  can compete but 
one  of  the  most obvious   is   that  of price   leadership  in  the 
prime rate convention.     Cne of the three largest banks   in 
the   country,   but not  always   the  same  one,   announces  a 
change in the prime rate which is generally followed by the 
rest of the  country.     wojnilower and Speagle report that 
as   of September  19^6,   fourteen of  twenty-three  recorded 
changes   in  the  prime  rate were  initiated  by   one  of  three 
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New "ork banks.  In economic theory, this is considered 
to be an entirely natural outcome of market concentration 
without any explicit collusion. 
It is impossible to know whether the market rate 
would te lower in the absence of the prime rate convention. 
However, the difference would depend on the ability of 
borrowers to ottain moneys in the open market and on how 
often bankers actually do violate the prime rate for their 
'cest customers. The prime rate is sticky downward, so in 
times of easy money the difference in the open market rate 
and the prime rate is greater as is the tendency for bankers 
to violate the convention because customers are more likely 
to go to the open market for funds at a cheaper rate. 
J. S. ". Wilson found through interviews with bankers that 
one-fourth of those interviewed broke the prime rate con- 
vention in 1961 when money was easy but saw no reason to 
Co  same when money was relatively tight in 1955 and 195^. 
1Albert M. v/ojnilower and Richard S. Speagle, "The 
Frime Rate," Tssavs in ::one.v and .redit Tederal Reserve 
Bank of New York (19^), p. 1^. 
2J. 3. G. Wilson, "Keener Competition in Commercial 
'ing," The "anker (September 19^2) 
(2 
So while anchoring the whole interest rate structure, 
the prime  rate  is  to some extent sensitive to the laws 
of supply   and demand in extreme situations. 
V/here banks are in direct competition with nonbanking 
institutions they are far more price competitive than in 
strictly banking areas  like demand deposits.     In the area of 
time or savings accounts,  banks compete directly with other 
money market institutions that sell substitutes  like 
Treasury bills  and commercial paper.     Savings accounts are 
in direct competition with more specialized  institutions 
such as savings  and loan banks.    Although the courts do 
not recognize these other areas as direct competitors of 
banks,   they must offer a competitive rate of interest to 
attract funds in these areas. 
However in the strictly banking area of demand deposits, 
price competition in the form of interest paid on demand 
deposit accounts   is  prohibited by  law.     The  more  vigorous 
competition  in this area takes place   in the nonprice areas 
of advertising,   promotion and  service.     The  promotional 
service of no service char£e demand deposits  "costs" banks 
money but may win customers  for other services.     It appears 
that  in North Carolina  the  large banks  feel no need  to 
offer  "free"  checking in times of easy money as in 1970. 
Also at this time the three  largest banks were at their peak 
of concentration power especially in the larger cities. 
New  "insurgent" banks were the only banks offering free 
checking in 1970.     In 197*1 the market was very tight and 
competition became more  intense, all three banks coming 
out with new advertising campaigns similar to  "Bank the 
V/achovia Free Way".    T'y  this  time because of the 1970 
amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,   the 
three largest banks were having to relinquish some of the 
nonbanking powers  they had acquired between 1968 and 1970. 
Again it appears that the North Carolina banking market is 
sensitive to  the laws of supply and demand but competitive 
M~ly  in times  of extreme  down   turn  in the  economy. 
"iArc:'Tr-" AND ccrrsTiTTC" 
There are several studies  that support the view that 
while branching tends to promote concentration of the banking 
industry,   it also  tends  to  increase  competition.     In an 
unpublished study by Richard Wallace,  reviewed in Guttentag 
and Herman,1 a unit banking area, Charleston,  South Carolina, 
was compared with a limited branching area,  Richmond, 
Virginia,  and an unlimited branching area,   Charlotte, North 
Carolina.     Analyzing  the business loan market,  Wallace 
concludes that Charleston had the least vigorous competition 
Richard Wallace,   "businessmen and Their Banks 1 
Observations on Interbank Competition in Six Local i.arkets, 
undated, mimeographed cited in Jack M. Guttentag and Edward 
"'.   "erman,   "Banking  Structure and  Performance,"  The bulletin 
York University   (February  19^7)»   P«  70. 
while Charlotte maintained the more vigorous atmosphere. 
In a companion  study,   Clifton Kreps     looks at the  same 
geographical areas but at more product lines including 
demand deposits,   time and savings deposits, short term 
business   loans,   consumer installments and residential 
mortgages.     Kreps's conclusions agreed with those of Wallace, 
deferring back to Graph  1 Total Shares of Bank Deposits 
Held  by  the  Three Largest Banking  Organizations   it appears 
that  these  banks'   shares  of  the market remained   fairly 
equal over the period  from 1959 to 197^  implying competition 
if not  fierce  competition.     However,   at  the  same  time  the 
concentration ratio for these three banks increased 
implying that the three maintained their market powers with 
respect to  the rest of the banking market in North Carolina. 
These  facts are consistent with the theory  that branching 
has  the effect of intensifying competition.     "The intensity 
of branch  competition during transition periods  of market 
entry  has,   in fact,  been used  as  an  argument against branch 
banks."2     The  reasoning  behind   this  argument  is   that  the 
competitive  tactics of branch banking exceed the bounds of 
fair play  and  become  predatory.     The  size  and  power of an 
Clifton H.   Kreps.   Jr.,   ^haracter and  Competitiveness 
of Local  banking,"   undated,   mimeographed   cited  in Guttentag, 
p.   71. 
2Guttentag,   p.   78. 
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already  established bank are used  in these situations to 
intimidate,   coerce and destroy smaller rivals who might 
be attempting to enter the market.    To  this extent branch- 
ing while intensifying competition, at the same time tends 
to  increase concentration and  create larger banking organi- 
zations while reducing the absolute number of organizations, 
The statistics   in Tables  7,   8 and   10 demonstrate  that  this 
is  the case  in the North Carolina banking market. 
"NTRY  AND BRANCHING 
The relationship of new entry and branching is a very 
important aspect of competition in an unlimited branching 
state like North Carolina.    New entry,   like branching, 
increases competition but without the attendant problem of 
increasing size and power of an already  established bank. 
However,   in  an  unlimited  branching   state  there  are  several 
reasons   to depend on branching to expand  the banking mar- 
ket.     First,   more branches are likely to be approved by 
regulatory agencies  than new bank charters out of cautious- 
ness.     A new  office  that  is   unprofitable means  failure  for 
a unit bank but only a setback for a larger branching bank. 
Second,   a branch  bank  can be maintained  in  urban areas 
where  a  unit bank would  fail.     Third,  as going  concerns, 
branching banks  are more   likely   to  move  rapidly   to  exploit 
attractive branching  opportunities. 
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In North Carolina, the authorities have chosen to 
approve liberally branching request. This has not been the 
fate of new bank charters.  Between 1959 and 19?0 only 9 
new banks were chartered but 710 new branches were opened. 
This extreme dependence on branching to expand the banking 
market has the dual effect of increasing competition and 
concentration. 
I3IC5 C0KF5TITI0N 
Attempts to quantify the effects of concentration on 
the going rate of interest have met with grave difficulties 
created by the nature of banking. Before outlining the 
outstanding studies in this field, some expansion of these 
difficulties is in order. 
One source of difficulty concerns the variation in the 
structure of banking organizations. Generally banks are 
delineated by branching or unit banking organizations. 
These variations include differences in size and number of 
offices within a single organization or geographic area. 
The rise in popularity of the one bank holding company adds 
further confusion to this issue.  The intrabank organization 
differs greatly between nonholding company banks and one 
bank or multibank holding companies. 
6? 
In addition to the problem created by  the variations  in 
structure,   is  the problem of choosing a distinctive service. 
The service   or product must be singular to the commercial 
banking   industry  in order to examine relevant markets.     Loan 
rates are most commonly used  for this kind  of analysis but 
the differences  in loan characteristics and supply and 
demand conditions  must be  taken  into account.     "Failure  to 
explain the variations  in loan rates resulting from these 
factors,   moreover,  may make concentration appear to have 
come relationship to rates when in reality  it does not, 
or vice versa." 
Once the choice of a distinctive service is made the 
problem of how to represent that service arises.     There 
are problems  associated with either selecting a specific 
loan rate such as business  loans or with choosing a cluster 
of loan rates.     Although the data on the return on all bank 
loans is   readily available from individual bank reports, 
these  rates   will  include differences  in  loan portfolios 
as well  as  differences  in  loan characteristics.     In addition, 
using groups  of loans does not reflect differences  in 
markets. 
Theodore G.   Flechsig,  BflB&lnfi 5truc*"?;* *"* EgggSgo 
in MetrotjQlitaB Areas.   (Washington.  Boara of Governors ance  in etropolis..  ^-—.        ^ 
of the  Federal  Reserve  System,   1965;.   P«   ll' 
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Gn the other hand, if rates on a specific type of loan 
are used, the problem of the banking practice of dealing in 
package terms arises. Specifically, when granting a loan 
bankers may take into consideration the cluster of services 
used by specific customers before setting the price of the 
loan.  This is the case especially for business loans where 
the loan rate is tied not only to credit ratings, loan size, 
and maturity date, but also by the customer's balances over 
an extended period of time, noncredit services offered by 
the bank, collateral business brought to the bank by the 
customer as well as other nonquantifiable factors.  This 
will tend to increase the real cost of the loan but will 
not be reflected in the interest rate charged for that 
specific loan.  This has particular consequence to this study 
as the Federal Reserve reports that large banks usually 
require compensating balances while most small banks do not. 
Customers also add to the nonuniformity of prices. 
Transactions with banks often involve a large degree of 
bargaining and within certain range, the loan rate may be 
effected by the aggressiveness or power of the customer. 
Choosing small business loans will eliminate some of these 
problems. Because of their smallness, these customers have 
^oard of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Federal Reserve r.ulletin (Washington! U. S. Government 
Printing Office, June 195°),   p. 57c. 
<9 
few real alternatives  either from nonbanking institutions 
or  from banks  outside  their  immediate geographical  area. 
This  limits  their bargaining power.    Substantiating  this 
theory   is a survey published  in the Federal Reserve Bulletin 
in April,   1956.     The survey established  that more than 90^ 
of the  small  businessmen  having  outstanding  debts   of 
'   0,000 or less had borrowed within their own metropolitan 
area.1 
Finally, there is great variation in the things that 
effect price competition of banking services other than 
bank structure adding to the problems of ferreting out the 
effects of concentration on bank service pricing. 
These include population density, income levels, 
growth rates of population and income, degree 
of urbanization, availability of nonbanking 
alternatives, local or regional differences in 
overall supply of and demand for funds, bank 
costs, and local traditions regarding the terms 
on which particular services are provided. 
Some of these variables are correlated with bank structure, 
making it difficult or impossible to sort out their 
separate effects. 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Federal Reserve Pulletin (Washington! U. S. Government 
Printing Office, April, 1956)• P- 3*5. 
2Guttentag, p. 80. 
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CUTLINS OF STUDIES 
With these problems in mind, the following studies 
address the problem of analyzing price competition in 
banking.  Schweiger and KcGee1 use information on consumer 
installment loans obtained by expert 'shopping' surveys 
of banks and other financial institutions in various cities 
during 19^0.  To avoid having to allow for differences in 
risk, loan size, maturity, and other features of loan 
transactions, the survey asked for quotations on standardized 
automobile loans and unsecured cash installment loans. 
Their findings are as followsi 
There was evidence that if banking in a 
particular area became too concentrated with a 
small number of banks dominating the city, rates 
might be set quite high. The extreme case here 
was providence with average car loan rates of 
about 13.0 percent and a cash loan rate of 15.0 
percent.  Other cities with relatively concentrated 
banking structures and high bank charges for loans 
were Detroit (11.6 car and 12.5 cash loan), San 
Francisco (11.4 car and 13.7 cash loan), and 
Cleveland (10.8 car and 1^.1 cash loan). On the 
other hand, the lowest city-wide bank rates for 
both types of loans were found where there were 
numerous large banks in active competition.  The 
outstanding cases here were Few York City (9.7 car 
and 9.1 cash loan) and Boston (9.0 car and 10.8 
cash loan)2 
1Trving Schweiger and John S. ?:cGee, "Chicago Banking," 
The Journal'of Business (July 196"l), pp. 260-271. 
2Ibid, p. 265. 
- 
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These findings are suggestive but make no allowance for 
factors other than concentration.    The study suggest that 
while concentration implies  higher rates,  large numbers 
of banks does not guarantee  lower rates. 
Franklin Edwards1 was  the first to use statistical 
controls  to separate concentration effects from other 
influences.     In brief,   Edwards'   model  contains  a multiple 
regression analysis   relating the average contract rate on 
businesc  loans  in 49 cities  to concentration ratios for these 
areas and to other factors affecting these rates.    This 
analysis was carried  through for three classes of loan sizes 
thus   trying  to  distinguish wholesale  from retail  trade. 
Edwards found  that loan rates tend to be highest where 
concentration is highest and where demand is greatest.     He 
used   the  percent  increase  in manufacturing  employment  to 
measure demand.     At  the  same  time,   loan rates  tended   to be 
lowest where the average size loan is greatest and where a 
large percentage of the loans had maturity dates of less 
than a year.     These findings  imply that market power effects 
the loan rate,   concentration in banking raises loan rates 
while monopsony power lowers   them. 
Franklin Edwards, Concentration and Competition in 
Commercial Tanking, A statistical Study. Research Report 
:'o.   ?J-.   (:-:o:---toni   Federal Reserve Bank of Boston,   19c*).   p.   20. 
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Cf further interest in this study is the amount of 
weight concentration carried in the total equation. 
The absolute importance of the concentration 
variables however is rather small...a lot 
increase in concentration will, on the average, 
increase loan rates by only six basis points. 
Or if concentration were to increase by 60^, 
which is approximately the range of concentration 
values among the ^9 metropolitan areas, loan . 
rates would increase by only 3^ basis points. 
Also, when considering borrower size the effect of con- 
centration decreases as the size of the loan increases. 
"For example, in the class $1 to $50 thousand (1955) a 
20* increase in concentration raises loan rates on the 
average, by 36 basis points. In the size class $50-$250 
thousand, the same increase in concentration raises rates 
2 
by only 1^ basis points." 
Tl ese findings underscore the difficulties in separating 
the variables  that determine interest rates.     It is apparent 
wever that concentration in the banking market pushes  the 
interest rate up.     Also,   this power can be ameliorated by 
an equally powerful borrower reducing the rate  to some extent. 
Some of the difficulties in obtaining and distinguishing 
the  importance of the effects of concentration on isolated 
"    iking   services has already been pointed out.     A more 
1Tbid,   pp.   296-297. 
2Ibid,   p.   29^. 
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comprehensive measurement might show a greater rate of 
concentration are affected by  some other factor that also 
effects   rates   then the cause and effect chain is not valid 
and an overstatement of concentration effects would result, 
'his  is  the argument advanced by Theodore G.   Flechsig 
in Banking "arket Structure and Performance in Metropolitan 
Areas.     Flechsig concludes  that the small but statistically 
significant effect of concentration on prices that Edwards 
found was actually due to regional differences.     His 
reasoning goes as  follows.     Edwards includes mutual savings 
banks,  which are clustered in the East and thus generates 
a statistical relationship between concentration and region. 
Furthermore,  with no apparent relationship to concentration, 
loan rates usually are lower in the East than in the rest of 
the  country. 
Adding 19 major cities to the original 49 metropolitan 
areas of Edwards'   study,  Flechsig  includes variables to 
measure regional differences.    Ey doing this,   the concen- 
tration effects of Edwards'   model disappear.    Flechsig 
concludes: 
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The results of the analysis do not prove that 
concentration is unrelated to market power. 
The findings do indicate, however, that within 
the range of existing concentration levels and 
in the context in which deposit concentrations 
are usually employed, no identifiable relation- 
snip was discovered between concentration ratios 
and the level of interest rates on business loans. 
This was true even for small borrowers who are 
restricted to financing within their local areas 
and, therefore, would be more vulnerable to 
noncompetitive pricing practices.1 
1Flechsig, p. 66. 
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CHAFTER  VI 
RELATIVE F3RFCRMANCE 
EFFICIENCY 
The question of whether large banks are more  efficient 
than small banks  is inseparable from the question of whether 
branch banks are more efficient than unit banks because most 
of the  largest and   few of the smallest banks are branching 
banks.     Operational efficiency refers to the real cost of 
providing specific  services.     Allocative efficiency refers 
to the extent to which resources are channeled into appro- 
priate  uses   from  the  standpoint  of  the  community  served by 
a specific bank. 
In trying  to quantify operational efficiency   there is 
the problem of adding apples and oranges.     As a relationship 
between  output and   input,   operational efficiency  could  be 
measured   easily   if bank  outputs  and   inputs  were  similar 
and   easily   identifiable.     However this  is  not  the   case.     It 
often  is  not  clear  exactly  what  a unit of  output  is  in a 
financial  institution.     For  example,   is   loan output  to  be 
measured  by  the  number of dollars  loaned   or  the number  of 
loans  made?     This   question  is  solved   in most  of  the  litera- 
ture by  a matter of  convenience.     Output  is  measured  in  terms 
of dollars  because   the  data available  are  in  dollar  terms. 
The second problem of adding apples and oranges involves 
the weighting of inputs and  outputs.     If banks are multi- 
service   institutions,   they   have  several  types  of credit 
and  deposit  services  which  employ  nonhomogeneous  labor 
inputs as well as  other kinds of inputs.    By means of 
functional cost analysis  it is possible to segregate the 
inputs  attributable to each of several homogeneous outputs 
but a system  of weights  must be assigned  in  order  to 
combine  inputs. 
The majority of statistical studies of banking efficiency 
have not  used  weighting  systems  but  have  used some  variant 
of expense/asset ratios as a measure of efficiency.    The 
following is  an outline of the problems incurred by not 
weighting  the ratios and  the biases produced by  these ratios. 
FRCPLE^S   CF f-'CT WEIGHTING 
Either total assets or total earnings has often been 
used by   investigators.     This  procedure implies that $1  of 
one  type   of asset  is  equal  to  $1  of any   other asset while  to 
the  owner  of  these  assets   their worth  varies  widely  with 
respect to  terms of expense,   risk,   convenience,   liquidity 
and  other  factors. 
*A thorough discussion of weighting systems  is found 
in Appendix  A  of Guttentag,   pp.   169-l»u. 
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A more refined method gives certain assets a greater 
weight if they  are relatively costly to acquire.     By 
means of a multiple regression analysis the ratio of 
expenses  to  assets   is  related   to  the  importance  of different 
types  of assets  in bank portfolios.    This method does not 
assign weights   in a systematic way because of the narrowness 
in defining the relative weights.     The only assets given 
weight are  those that are relatively expensive to obtain 
such as consumer-installment loans.    So while the  theory 
of weighting  is  good   the  implementation  if;   limited   to  only 
a few bank assets. 
It  should  be  noted  that  even  a good  system of weighting 
assets does not make allowance for a bank's noncredit output 
while their expenses are included  in total expenses.     The 
provision of deposit and trust services as well as branch 
offices affect bank expenses but are not included   in bank 
output. 
On  the  input side,   all statistical  studies  of bank 
efficiency   use  current expenses as  the  input measure.     This 
implies  that the market prices of inputs are the appropriate 
weights.     One problem associated with this procedure 
pertains to interest payments  on time deposits.    t.,ost 
economists would classify such interest payments as  inputs 
to   the  bank,   not  the  community,   suggesting  that  the  expense 
ratios  of banks having relatively large interest payments 
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are biased upward.     Some studies allow for this by  listing 
interest payments as a separate expense.     Others adjust 
expense to asset ratios  for the influence on expense of 
varying ratios  of total deposits  in the liability structure 
of different banks.     Neither is particularly satisfactory. 
Another problem with the use of current expenses   to 
measure current bank inputs is that, because of insuf- 
ficient data,   investigators must assume that all wage 
and salary  rates are the same for all banks.    Clearly this 
is an inappropriate assumption especially when the study 
covers a broad geographical area. 
The  literature  that approaches the comparison of the 
efficiency  of large verses small banks,   or similarly, 
branch versus unit banks uses one of two approaches.     One 
approach  is to make a comparison of the efficiency  of 
branch and  unit banks of the same size class)   and the second 
approach  compares   the  efficiency   of different size  classes 
regardless  of organization.    Both use expense/asset ratios 
that  involve  certain biases  which  are  unavoidable because 
of systematic  differences  of  the  two groups  concerning 
growth  rates,   asset  structures,   range  of noncredit  services, 
interest payments  on  time  deposits,  and  wage  and  salary  rates. 
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All of the biases seem to overstate the  expenses of 
branch banks and   therefore underrate their efficiency. 
This  is particularly noticeable when size is held  constant 
in comparisons  of branch and unit banking. 
The problem of using a span of one years  time,  either 
calendar or fiscal,   produces a bias that makes rapidly 
growing banks  look less efficient than slower growing banks, 
"xpense/asset ratio studies  implicitly assume that expenses 
incurred   in a given year can be attributed to assets on 
hand at the end  of that year.     Some assets have a life 
longer than one year and the more of these in a bank's 
asset structure  the lower the expense ratio.     Thus  the 
more established or slower growing bank will look relatively 
more efficient than the rapidly growing bank.       Large banks 
grow slower than small ones so this bias would tend  to 
overstate a large bank's efficiency. 
The second bias also involves the differences  in asset 
structure.     Branch banks generally attempt to capture the 
small household business.    Their asset makeup is largely   in 
loans,   the most expensive kind of asset to acquire.     Also, 
r"ost of their loans are of the consumer installment kind, 
the most  expensive  kind  of  loan  to make.     Within the business 
~ome implications can be drawn with respect to class of 
bank and  growth  rate  from  the  study  by David and  Charlotte_ 
Alhadeff,   "Growth Rates of Large 3anks-1930-19*0," The Seview 
of  Tconomics   and  Statistics.   (November 19^),  PP«   J^~JbJ- 
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loan category, branch banks undertake more small loans 
thus resulting again in a more expensive type of asset. 
Table 13 exhibits the result of this bias. The differences 
in asset structure result in a bias because the expense/ 
asset ratio is calculated in a manner indifferent to the 
differences in earning power of assets. 
TABLE 13 
CURRENT  OPERATING  EXPENSES A3 FERCENT OF ASSETS, 
SELECTED YEARS,   1950-1964 
Bank Deposits 
in 
Nillions 
Less   than  £.5 
California United  States 
*« 
1950 1950       1959 
Fercent  of Loans  and 
Investments 
4.3< 
3.40 
3.60 
;. "■- 
2.56 
2.82 
2.55 
1.99 
2.71 
2.45 3.48 
2.?"- 3-39 
2.23 3.47 
3.55 
2.19 3.54 
2.08 3.42 
3.38 
1.71 
3.01 
1959        1964 
Fercent of 
Total  Assets 
2.90 3.45 
.5-1.0 
1-2 
2-5 
5-10 
10-2 5 
25-50 
50-100 
100-500 
More  than  100 
More  than 500 
*Unit member banks  only.     Intervals are,   under 2,   2-5, 
15-50,   50-150,   and more than 150. 
All  insured  banks. 
2.84 3.46 
2.76 3.^1 
2.83 3.44 
2.89 3.51 
2.87 3.49 
2.72 3-38 
2.58 3.17 
2.25 2.91 
2,   2-5, 5-15, 
Sourcest     Tables Bl and E4;   FDIC,   Annual Reports,   1964, 
p.   204;   1959,  P.   154. 
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The cost incurred in providing noncredit services by 
banks is included in expenses but not reflected in asset 
holdings.  This fact creates another bias in expense/asset 
ratios.  Trust services, deposit services and bank offices 
fall into this category.  Assuming that big banks offer 
proportionately more services than small banks, this bias 
would make the large bank look less efficient than the 
small. Since the convenience offered by branches is not 
reflected in the ratio but the expense is, then branch 
banks again will look less efficient than unit banks. 
The last bias of note is that, since large banks are 
usually located in more urban areas than small ones, they 
tend to pay higher rents and salaries once again distorting 
the expense asset ratio. 
RATIOS 
Taking  into  account  all  these biases,   expense/asset 
ratios  are  not completely   useless.     Table   Ik  consists  of 
different efficiency ratios for banks of different size 
classes with no structural differentiations.    The ratio of 
total  operating  expenses   total assets  rises  until  a bank's 
total deposits reach $50 million and  thereafter it falls. 
This   implies   that  economies  of scale  decrease  at  this  size. 
Additionally,   if  this  is   examined   in  conjunction with  the 
number of  employees  per  office  the  conclusion  is  inescapable 
Banks  experience rapid diseconomies of scale and suffer with 
respect to efficiency beyond these siz^s. 
I.. LE lk 
EPFICIENCY   RATIOS  FOR  BANKS   OF DIFFERENT  3IZS 
3LASSE     _-'  NORTH   CAROLINA,   MAY,   1973 
Less 
::ank 
Size 
than 
2.000 
Net Income/ 
Total Assets .00781 
"otal operating 
income/ 'cotal 
assets .056151+8 
Total operating 
expenses/total 
assets .01+53953 
Net Income/ 
Total Capital ,0664?62 
Capital/ 
Total Assets .117^856 
No. of banks/ 
"o. of employees 
■"• officers .1806282 
No. of employees/ 
No. of banks 5.536 
2,000- 
c.000 
5,000- 
10.000 
10,000- 
■ '. 'r: 
.007223k       .008182 
.075959*+  .09^529 
,0950957  .086556 
25,000- 
50.000 
.OO8521*;   .OO85377 
,0563285   .0570228     .0571+033    .0578636 
.0469365   .0^6^875     ,0Ur.Ck?2 .0^74281 
.106751+8 .1067628 
.0798228 .0799691 
,1191+996        .07306,17 .035931 .0163182 
.?'-2 13.687 27.S3 61.28 
S 
.  LE  14   (cont.) 
I -nk 
Size 
50,000- 
100.000 
100,000- 
500.000 
500,000- 
or more 
Net Income/ 
Total Assets .008198 .0078763 .007138 
A measure of return 
on total funds. 
Total operating 
income/total 
assets .0572662 .05*1385 .0515019 
A measure of gross 
yield to total funds. 
Total operating 
expenses/total 
assets .<*73?39 .0463539 .0419559 
A measure of the cost 
of acquiring and 
maintaining a stock 
of income-producing 
assets. 
Net Income/ 
Total Assets .104365 .100*012 .0886854 
A measure of return 
on investment should 
increase with bank 
size. 
Capital/ 
Total Assets .0785512 .07842 53 .0804949 
Should vary inversely 
with bank size. 
No. of tanks/ 
No. of employees 
and officers .0081915 .0026762 .00034*2 
No. of employees/ 
No. of banks 122.0^7 373.65 2887.9 
No. of employees 
per bank. 
Sourcei  Federal Reserve Bulletin, May, 1973. PP 104-106. 
CO 
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Reference to other ratios  in this area bears out the 
conclusion that somewhere  in the range of 50 to 100 million 
dollars in total deposits  is the point at which banks begin 
to experience diseconomies of scale.    Having considered 
the ratio of total expenses/total assets as the cost of 
acquiring and maintaining a stock of income producing assets, 
an analysis  of the ratio of total operating income/total 
assets will result in a measure of gross yield  to total 
funds.     Again the ratio rises up to the 25-50 million dollar 
total deposits.     For the group of banks with 50 million 
dollars in total deposits and more the gross yield falls. 
As one would  expect the same is true for the ratio of net 
income/total  assets  which  is  defined  as  a measure  of  return 
on total funds. 
Additionally  turning from total asset ratios and con- 
sidering capital ratios the same conclusions are borne out. 
Met  income/total  capital  is  a measure  of  return on  invest- 
ment and  should   increase with the size of a bank if economies 
of scale are  present.     This  ratio  too begins  to  fall for 
banks  larger than 50 million dollars   in total deposits. 
These  measures  are not precise  enough to  make  a policy 
suggestion that no bank should be larger than 50 million 
dollars   in  total  deposits,   however they  do  suggest  that  the 
argument of savings for the customer is not a valid argument 
for increasing  the size of banks  that fall into this size 
category. 
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A more positive case can be made for large banks if 
allocative  efficiency   is used as a standard rather than 
operational efficiency.     The large bank is better able to 
enter into service competition than the small bank.    This 
has nothing to do with whether the service is actually 
used but is borne out in a study by Weintraub and Jessup for 
the House Committee on Banking and  Currency.    These research- 
ers found  that in all but a few cases services were offered 
more often by a large bank than a small one. 
Kohn concludes  his  study  of New York State similarly. 
Since mergers create  larger banks,   he examined the increase 
in services  reported to be direct outgrowths of mergers. 
Four out of five of the 205 mergers considered resulted 
immediately   in the addition of at least one new service. 
The services most often added were,   in order of frequency, 
personal and  corporate trust service,  car dealer paper 
purchase,   term  loans   to business,   home  improvement  loans, 
special checking accounts,   direct auto loans and Christmas 
2 
club accounts. 
Robert V.'eintraub and Faul Jessup,   A Study of Selected 
"ankinp  Services bv  "ank  Size.   Structure,   and Location,   A 
Report  prepared   for  the  Sub-Committee  on Domestic_ Finance  of 
the House  Committee  on  ranking  and   Currency   (Washington, 
196*),  p.   163. 
2Emest Kohn,   ?r*nrh  *ankjn*.   Fank Mergers  and  the 
Public  Tntfli-Rst.   (Few York.   Few York State Banking Department, 
19f4),   pp.   156-160. 
- 1  15 
AVAILABILITY OF SELECTED BANKING SERVICES 
IN NEW YORK STATE 
SPRING 19^2 
Number of Reporting Banks 
Type of Service 
Special Checking Accounts 
Christmas Club Accounts 
Term Loans to Business 
Direct Auto Loans 
Purchased Paper (Auto 
Dealers) 
Home Improvement Loans 
Fersonal Trust 
Corporate Trust 
Safe Deposit Boxes 
In-plant Banking 
Travelers Checks 
'. epository 
New York City 
 Banks 
Major Cther 
Banks Banks 
}anks Cutside New York City 
Unit 
Banks 
Major 
3ranch 
tanks 
Branch 
Banks 
with only 
In-town 
Offices 
All 
Other 
Branch 
Banks 
(percentage of reporting banks offering service) 
21 155 29 11 85' 
894? gg ■ 721 10O1 9itf 89^ 
.0 
75 89 100 91 98 
100 71 65 97 82 78 
89 76 92 97 100 98 
56 29 56 97 ", 76. 
78 67 83 90 100 96 
100 52 21 93 55 67 
100 ^8 12 36 36 kB 
100 '2 97 100 91 100 
56 5 l* 52 0 7 
100 100 100 •    3 100 100 
100 76 71 100 100 98 
For certain services, data were available for only 83 or 8k  banks. 
CO 
OS 
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If  the matter of efficiency were a simple matter of 
cost accounting there would he no question concerning the 
optimal size of banking organizations.     The point at which 
banks started   experiencing diseconomies of scale would be 
easily discernible and appropriate action could be taken. 
However,   since  consumer welfare is the more important basis 
for judgment the question leaves the realm of mere numbers 
and  becomes  a matter of   judgment.     North Carolina's  banking 
■ :et is  clearly heavily  concentrated  to such an extent that 
it logically  follows that there is a loss in consumer welfare. 
Industrial organization theorists agree that high concentra- 
tion  produces  price  leadership whether  implicit  or explicit 
and   eventually   results   in  a  loss   in consumer welfare. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
There   is no question that the banking market conce  - 
-ion of "orth Carolina has increased dramatically since 
1955,     This   concluding  section evaluates whether or not  this 
trend achieves  a balance between growth,   competition and 
efficiency.     In other words,  whether or not the banking 
market of North Carolina approaches a   'socially optimal 
structure'. 
Defining a socially optimal structure in banking   if 
particularly  difficult because banking is neither a public 
nor a private good.     On the one hand   it needs regulation 
because of the central function the  industry performs  in the 
tional economy.     On  the  other hand,   it  is  not an  industry 
that  exhibits   natural monopoly  characteristics     Competition 
is needed  in the banking industry  to avoid concentration in 
such  a powerful  industry.     Furthermore,   there  are  in banking, 
as  in most  industries,   economies  of scale  that eventually 
turn into diseconomies.     Pinpointing where economies cease 
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and diseconomies begin should be one of the tasks of the 
regulatory  agencies. 
Stuart Ireenbaum describes four performance character- 
'   : Los which he feels should be the aim of the regulatory 
ncies. 
1) Jroductive efficiency—the social costs  of 
producing banking services with an optimal 
structure would be equal or less than the 
social cost of producing the same services 
with any other implementable banking structure. 
2) Allocative neutrality—the overall allocation 
of resources  in the economy would not be 
appreciably   influenced by  any peculiarity 
in the banking structure. 
3) Absence of exploitation of consumers or 
suppliers  of input-banks  cannoi behave 
like monopolist or monopsonist. 
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k)    Responsivity   to changes in technology and in 
demand for banking services—time required 
by   the banking system to adopt new technology 
and   to adjust its operations to shifts  in the 
composition and magnitude of the public's 
demand  for  financial  services. 
The difficulty  is  that by  the nature of banking, 
these goals conflict with one another.     Productive efficiency 
implies  the need  for large banking organizations to take 
advantage  of economies  of scale available in the financial 
services.     Responsivity   to changes in technology and demand 
is also more easily achieved by a large bank with personnel 
assigned  to keeping abreast of these changes.     On the other 
hand,  allocative neutrality  and absence of exploitation 
occur when the banks in the system are relatively small and 
independently owned,   facilitating a competitive structure. 
Needless  to say   implementing these guidelines is  a 
complex task and,   as is  true in so many instances in 
Economics,   a completely   objective  method   of investigation 
has not been discovered.     Subjectively,   however,   one  can 
ascertain if the requirements  of technological efficiency and 
benefits  of competition are being balanced by  the  regulatory 
agencies. 
Stuart areenbaum,   "Banking Structure -d C?^^ercial 
Statistical Study   of the  Cost-Output Relationsnii 
"anking,"   Unpublished  Doctoral Dissertation   (The  Johns 
'"'opkins  University,   19^).  P«   !3« 
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•; ■ T:T,ATGRY  ACTIVITIES   1955-10?^ 
The North Carolina Commissioner of Banks, Board of 
Governors  of the Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance 
Agency and The Comptroller of the Currency have all been 
lenient with merger approvals between 1955 and  1970.    The 
number of banks  in North Carolina,  as noted earlier, was 
reduced by  more than one-half during this period.    This trend 
slowed considerably after the passage of the 1970 Amendment 
to trie Bank Folding Company Act of 1956.    Between 1970 and 
197^ there was a net  loss   of only six banks.    Because of the 
Amendment,   the regulatory agencies became more stringent in 
approving mergers and  acquisitions in situations where it was 
felt that they might be detrimental to competition.    It is 
important  to note that the mere knowledge of this new regu- 
latory attitude served  to deter potential applications for 
merger or acquisition. 
Even with  the  slowing  of  the  merger rate  in North 
Carolina after 1970,   the overall trend of the market 
structure has been toward   concentration.    In 1955 there were 
220 banking organizations but by   197^ there were only  92. 
Another factor that contributed to the increase in 
concentration is  the branching policies of the regulatory 
agencies.     During the period  1955 to 1970 branching was 
rampant-  a net increase of 793 branches brought the North 
Carolina total to  1119 branches.     While mergers decreased 
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between 1970 and   197k,  branching, increased at an even faster 
rate.    The four year increase was 428 branches.    While 
branching increases  competition to some extent by  increasing 
the number of banking offices available to the public,   it also 
serves to  increase concentration by   increasing the size of 
the banks already  in the market.    The ultimate effect of such 
active branching  is best understood   in conjunction with 
entry policies. 
There has been very  little activity in the area of new 
entry in North Carolina since 1955-    Between 1955 and  1970 
only  9 new banks were approved by the regulatory agencies. 
This  trend  has  increased since  1970.    For example there were 
6 new banks  established  in 197^ alone. 
In sum  it appears that the governing hodies are 
exhibiting  at   least a desire  to  slow down  the growth of 
concentration  in North Carolina banking.     The  decrease  in   ■ 
the approval of mergers and  the increase in the approval 
of new  entrants  potentially  will  increase  the  competition 
in the market.     However,  there  is little balance between 
the two,  mergers still far more prevelant than new banks. 
Tl e increase in branching has served only to make the North 
Carolina market more concentrated.     The share of total 
deposits accounted   for by the three  largest banks is still 
owing.     It is  evident that ,«uch is  left to do in order to 
balance the public   interest against the banking industry 
interest. 
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FCLICY  ALTERNATIVE: 
The banking  industry  in Forth Carolina appears to 
ached a plateau of concentration in the last two 
rs.     The  structural changes of the late i960's cemented 
the positions  of First Union,  Wachovia and NCNB as the 
leaders of the banking industry.     The main changes that 
have taken place since  I968 have been to increase their 
total  share  of   the  market with  respect  to all other tanks 
while their respective positions equalized.    Thus policy 
alternatives  to break the hold  that these tanks maintain 
over the banking market in North Carolina should be directed 
at the structure of these three banks. 
Tf the only aim of changing the banking structure 
were to eliminate concentration then the  job would be 
relatively easy.     A return to unit banking along with the 
elimination of bank holding companies of any sort would 
insure a market structure of a large number of small banks. 
Ls simple solution however,  disregards economies of scale, 
convenience and   efficiency in short all the things that 
provide consumer welfare. 
So  the   job of reorganization is complicated by 
including consumer welfare with elimination of concentration 
as parameters  for an optimal banking market structure.    As 
stated before the causes  of concentration in the North 
Carolina market - holding companies  and unlimited branching 
aided by minimal entry-- work at cross purposes.     On the one 
9*J 
hand branching adds considerably to consumer welfare by 
providing convenience and an illusion of smallness for 
the neighborhood bank customer.    Holding companies may in 
some instances cut costs for the customer because of the 
availability  of in-house operations — computer, courrier 
and printing services  to name a few.     Additionally strict 
entry requirements protect the consumer from bogus operations 
quickly entering and   leaving the market. 
On the  other hand, branching contributes  to concentra- 
tion by promoting  large sprawling banking operations which 
enter markets before new banks that are held back by the 
stricy entry  requirements.     While there is the possibility 
of economies  of scale for holding companies they have over- 
extended and cancel out the savings of necessary operations 
by entering   into not so closely related ventures and cover 
losses by bookkeeping shuffles. 
There  are  some dramatic  steps  that would  eliminate 
these  problems.     First because  of  the  vast gains  in consumer 
welfare maintain the present branching system in North 
Carolina but  at  the  same  time  relax  the  entry  requirements 
to the same level as those of the Federal regulatory 
agencies.     This step would enable new banks to enter markets 
previously  only  open to branches of already established 
banks increasing the number of banks in the market withou 
decreasing the number of actual offices available to the 
public   (a  consequence  of  unit banking). 
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The second step reduces  the size of the banks  in the 
narket by  curtailing the  activities of bank holding 
companies.     The new holding companies would limit the acti- 
vities to banking,   in-house computer service and courrier 
service.     This would add   to consumer welfare through savings 
in operations while eliminating  over-extension of banks 
into real estate,   renting,   insurance et cetera.     The bank 
holding company could  no  longer invest in broader line 
operations and would maintain the traditional separation 
of banking and   industry. 
The third and final step would break up the four 
largest banks   in North Carolina into C or more banks.     This 
could be accomplished by  limiting the size of any bank 
to total deposits   of $1 billion in 197^ dollars.     As seen 
in Table 10 the four largest banks account for over $1 
billion apiece and for 61.9* of the banking market in North 
Carolina.     By  dividing  these banks at least in half the 
market would be  less concentrated possibly with 9 banks 
accounting for 68.^ of the total deposits. 
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